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WHEN LAWYERS BREAK THE LAW: HOW THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
DISCIPLINES MEMBERS OF THE BAR
WHO COMMIT CRIMES
Larry Cunningham*
"[A lawyer] is received into that ancient fellowship for something more than
private gain. He becomes an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1
"Absent extraordinary circumstances... the commission of a crime by an attorney requires both for the maintenance of the integrity of the profession and
the protection of the public againstfuture misconduct by other attorneys, the
2
termination of his licensure to practice law."
INTRODUCTION

Lawyers are not immune to crime. With over one million persons possessing a
license to practice law in the United States, 3 it is not surprising that a small minority of our profession commits crime. For a number of reasons, such as financial hardship, greed, and substance abuse, some attorneys commit crimes, and are
punished by courts of law. 4 For a member of a licensed profession, however, a
criminal conviction and sentence does not end the matter. Disciplinary authorities also impose sanctions on professionals who commit crimes.
* Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia. Member, Virginia State Bar, New
York State Bar. J.D., 2000, Georgetown University Law Center; B.S., 1997, John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The author was previously a law clerk to the Honorable Claude M. Hilton, Chief Judge
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and a law clerk for the District of
Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility. The views expressed in this article are the author's
own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer, past or present.
I would like to thank Elizabeth J. Branda, Esquire, and Father Robert Drinan, S.J.,
for their assistance and advice in the writing and editing of this article. I would also like to thank Ericka Pearce for
her unwavering support.
1 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928).
2 In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 186 (D.C. 1976) (Kern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3 See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor Imposing
Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
4 See Jay Wilson, Comment, The Definitional Problems With "Moral Turpitude," 16 J. LEGAL
PROF. 261, 273 (1991) ("Although members of the bar are sworn to uphold the law and to advise
others to do so as well, attorneys and judges face the same trials and tribulations as the population in
general. All too often, members of the bar find themselves the subject of a criminal prosecution
rather than an advocate for an accused client. As evidenced by the large number of cases, attorneys
have been found guilty of crimes that span the entire spectrum of the penal statutes, ranging from the
most heinous too [sic] the smallest infraction.").
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Attorney discipline serves three functions; It protects the public from attorneys who pose a professional risk to them; It protects the administration of justice from dishonesty and malpractice; It preserves confidence in the legal system
by demonstrating
to the public that the bar is capable of dealing with rogue attor5
neys itself.
The question of what to do with these lawyer-criminals has plagued disciplinary authorities for decades. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, by statute, automatically disbars any attorney who is convicted of a crime of "moral
turpitude.",6 The Court's attempts to define "moral turpitude," however, have
been painstakingly complex and not without inconsistencies. In the District, the
inquiry is not whether an attorney should be disbarred for committing a certain
criminal act, but whether a particular criminal statute is one that punishes "moral
turpitude." Once it is found that an attorney has committed a crime of "moral
turpitude," the Court has no discretion; the attorney must be disbarred. With the
stakes so high, the Court has attempted to form a coherent jurisprudence on exactly which crimes are and are not ones of "moral turpitude."
The District of Columbia's approach to lawyer-crime has not escaped criticism.
"Moral turpitude is an elusive, vague, and troublesome concept in the law, incapable of precise definition; such is evidenced by the myriad of definitions and
interpretations in judicial opinions."' 7 In 1970, a report of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement
(known as the "Clark Committee") recommended that the "moral turpitude"
standard be abandoned, concluding instead that attorneys convicted of "serious
crimes" should be suspended, not disbarred.'

The Clark Committee also recom-

mended that each case should be decided taking
into account the individual cir9
cumstances of the offense and the offender.
This article will attempt to synthesize the D.C. Court of Appeals' jurisprudence on the discipline of lawyers who commit crimes. It will demonstrate that
the D.C. Court of Appeals' decisions, since the 1970s, are far from a disorganized
body of cases and rules. Rather, what has evolved over the last three decades has
been a "system," an organized and routine approach to the discipline of lawyercriminals. Part II will outline the procedural aspects and protections of the system. Part III will discuss dozens of Court of Appeals' cases on the subject of
"moral turpitude." It will attempt to draw the line between crimes that require
5 See generally Levin, supra note 3, at 17-18.
6 See D.C. CODE § 11-2503(a) (1981).
7 Wilson, supra note 4.
8 See Rachna K. Dhanda, Note, When Attorneys Become Convicted Felons: The Question of
Discipline By the Bar, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 723, 726 (1995).
9 See id. ("By considering the nexus between a particular crime and an attorney's fitness to
practice, the courts are better equipped to impose discipline that is appropriate for an attorney's
misconduct.").
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automatic disbarment and those that do not. Part IV will test the system by con-

sidering difficult cases-sad stories that from time-to-time have forced the Court
of Appeals to attempt to refine the "moral turpitude" line.
I.

PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK:

A

ROUTINE "SYSTEM"

Congress has vested the District of Columbia Court of Appeals with the power
to regulate the practice of law in Washington, D.C.'s non-federal courts. 10 Beginning on April 1, 1972, the D.C. Court of Appeals assumed the power to "censure,
suspend from practice, or expel a member of its bar."' 1 To assist it, the Court of
Appeals created a "Board on Professional Responsibility," consisting of nine

members-seven lawyers and two non-lawyers. 12 Each member is appointed by
the Court for three years. 1 3 The Board on Professional Responsibility has the
power to appoint a Bar Counsel, and assistants, to investigate and prosecute acts
of attorney misconduct.
A.

General Due Process Protections and ProceduralRules

Ultimate authority for attorney discipline rests with the D.C. Court of Appeals, not with the Board or Bar Counsel."n The Court will defer to the Board's

findings of fact. 15 Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo by the
Court. 16 The Board is empowered to refer matters to "hearing committees,"
17

which can take testimony under oath and make detailed findings of fact.
An attorney is entitled to due process during disciplinary proceedings because
such proceedings are "quasi-criminal in nature."' 8 Bar Counsel bears the burden
of proving charges of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. 19 An attor-

10 The federal courts located in Washington, such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, retain the power to regulate persons admitted to practice before them. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R.
46.
11 D.C. CODE § 11-2502 (1981).
12 See D.C. BAR. R. XI, § 4(a).
13 See id. § 4(c).
14 See Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15 See In re Dwyer, 399 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C. 1979).
16 The question of whether a crime is one of "moral turpitude" is a question of law, not of fact.
See In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C. 1988) ("In any event, we think that the ultimate issue of
moral turpitude is one of law rather than of fact.").
17 See D.C. BAR. R. XI, § 5.
18 In re Williams, 464 A.2d 115, 118-19 (D.C. 1983).
19 See id. at 119.
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ney is entitled to notice of the charges against him.20 However, attorneys are not
ipso facto entitled to every protection that a criminal defendant receives. 2 '
There is no statute of limitations for the institution of disciplinary proceedings.22 The purpose of disciplinary rules is not simply to punish attorneys, but to
also protect clients and society. 23 "[A]n attorney is in a continuing position of
trust toward clients, the courts, and society in general."'24 Accordingly, bar certification is also a continuing process.
B.

Procedure Upon Conviction of a Crime

The procedure upon an attorney's conviction of a crime is governed by D.C.
Code § 11-2503(a) and Section 10 of Rule XI of the District of Columbia Bar
Rules. D.C. Code § 11-2503 provides in pertinent part:
(a) When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified
copy of the conviction is presented to the court, the court shall, pending
final determination of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member
of the bar from practice. Upon reversal of the conviction the court may
vacate or modify the suspension. If a final judgment or conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be
struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so
convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.
Section 10 of Rule XI of the District of Columbia Bar Rules specifies the procedures to be followed upon an attorney's conviction of a crime. Upon receipt of
a certified copy of a record demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of
a "serious crime," the Court of Appeals immediately suspends an attorney from
practice.2 5 If the crime is not "serious," Bar Counsel may institute charges of
misconduct. If the crime is "serious," the only question to26be answered by the
Court is the "nature of the final discipline to be imposed."
20 See In re Washington, 513 A.2d 245 (D.C. 1986). "It is elementary that a fundamental requirement of due process is notice that apprises the interested parties of the pendency of the action
and affords them an opportunity to present their objections.... The same principles apply to disbarment proceedings." In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C. 1979).
21 See In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C. 1986).
22 See D.C. BAR. R. XI, § 1(c). However, in Williams the Court cautioned that Bar Counsel's
unjustified delay in instituting disciplinary charges that later results in prejudice to the attorney could
constitute a due process violation. See Williams, 513 A.2d at 797.
23 See id. at 795 ("The disciplinary rules protect clients from wayward attorneys, maintain the
integrity and competence of the legal profession, and save the judicial process from corruption.").
24 Id. at 796.
25 See D.C. BAR R. XI, § 10(c).
26 See id. § 10(d).
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The attorney's case is then referred to the Board on Professional Responsibility. As is discussed in the next section, the Board proceeds on either one of two
courses. If the crime the attorney has been convicted of has previously been
adjudicated by the Court of Appeals to be one of moral turpitude, the Board's
only function is to determine whether "the certificate of conviction... establishes
that the attorney, in fact, has been convicted of the crime charged.",27 If the particular crime has not been previously considered by the Court, the attorney and
Bar Counsel can brief and argue the issue of moral turpitude before the Board.28
However, the attorney is not free to "retry his criminal case before [t]he
Board.",2 9 The focus is not on the specific facts of the attorney's case but, rather,
on the type of crime committed.3" The attorney cannot challenge the facts that
led to conviction; he can only address the question of whether the crime itself is
one of moral turpitude.
Both the attorney and Bar Counsel can challenge the Board's finding of moral
turpitude, as the Court of Appeals has the final say on attorney discipline in the
District. 31 Once the Court of Appeals has ruled definitively on whether a particular crime constitutes moral turpitude, that decision cannot be revisited except on
32
en banc review.
An attorney's "guilty plea represents both a conviction of a crime and an admission by the accused of the underlying facts." 33 An attorney's Alford34 plea
will not save him from automatic disbarment if the crime is one of moral turpitude. 3 5 An attorney who has been convicted of a crime cannot collaterally challenge that conviction in discipline proceedings.3 6
C. Moral Turpitude Per Se and "On the Facts"
In In re Colson,37 the Court of Appeals defined the general, substantive structure for handling lawyer crimes. In Colson, a White House attorney pled guilty
to obstruction of justice. The Court of Appeals concluded that obstruction of
justice was per se moral turpitude. Because the attorney was convicted of a crime
of moral turpitude, his disbarment was automatic.38
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1165 (D.C. 1979).
See id. at 1165.
Id. at 1167.
See infra Part II.C.
See Laughlin, 474 F.2d at 444.
See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971).
In re Wolff, 490 A.2d 1118, 1119 (D.C. 1985).
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (guilty plea with assertion of factual innocence).
See In re Untalan, 619 A.2d 978 (D.C. 1993).
See Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Colson, 412 A.2d 1160.
See id. at 1165.
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Moral turpitude comes in two flavors: per se and on the facts. Both moral
turpitude per se and moral turpitude on the facts require automatic disbarment.
The difference is in the effect of the decision in a particular case on future cases.
When moral turpitude has been found per se, the Court of Appeals decrees in
a case 39 that conviction of that particular crime must always result in automatic
disbarment in every future case. For example, the Court may hold in In re A that
"Crime 1," by virtue of its very nature, must always result in automatic disbarment. The next time a case comes along where Attorney B, for example, has
been charged with "Crime 1," he will automatically be disbarred, without the
benefit of a hearing to determine whether the crime is one of moral turpitude. In
re A controls the decision in In re B. "The major difference between the pre- and
post-Colson decisions is not the court's ability to apply the appropriate sanction,
but the court's discretion in weighing the facts and circumstances of each
case.
40
The Court, by its own hand, has, in effect, abdicated this responsibility.,
However, consider a case, In re C, in which the Court of Appeals concludes
that "Crime 2" does not involve moral turpitude per se (that is, the commission of
"Crime 2" does not always involve moral turpitude). However, neither Attorney
C nor any others that follow are necessarily off the disciplinary hook. The Board
and Court can still conclude that the crime the attorney committed involved
moral turpitude on the facts. If so, the attorney is still automatically disbarred.
The difference is that Attorney C, Attorney D, and any others that follow are all
entitled to individual hearings to determine moral turpitude.
Even if a crime-whether per se or on the facts-is not found to involve moral
turpitude, the attorney can still be disciplined pursuant to Rule 8.4 of the D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in pertinent part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ...

(b)
(c)

Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation;

Thus, Bar Counsel gets three bites at the disbarment apple. He can argue to
the Board and the Court of Appeals that:
1. the offense which the attorney committed involves moral turpitude per
se, requiring automatic disbarment;
2. the facts of the attorney's specific case involve moral turpitude, requiring automatic disbarment; or
39 The decision of a panel can be reviewed by the Court en banc. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d
310, 312 (D.C. 1971).
40 Michael Cline, D.C. Code Section 11-2503(a): Disbarment or Banishment?, 32 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1038, 1047 (1983).
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3.

the attorney should be disbarred or otherwise disciplined pursuant to
Rule 8.4. However, action under this rule does not guarantee automatic
disbarment. Only commission of a crime involving moral turpitude,
whether per se or on the facts requires automatic disbarment.

This approach is not without criticism. First, automatic disbarment raises concerns about fairness to the attorney. It does not take into account mitigating
factors, such as alcoholism, 41 that may explain the attorney's behavior and explain why, because of changed circumstances, recidivism is not likely to occur.42
However, as the Court has reminded the bar and the public on numerous occasions, the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect society, not necessarily
to preserve the licensure "rights" of attorneys. 43 The interests of lawyercriminals is secondary to the interests of the public.
Second, the binding effect of moral turpitude per se determinations, it could be
argued, is an unfair use of stare decisis. If, in In re A, counsel for Attorney A did
not competently brief or argue the case against moral turpitude per se, that failure should not be imparted on future cases and attorneys. Similarly, a panel of
the Court of Appeals could be unconsciously influenced by certain aggravating
and heinous facts and find moral turpitude per se not just on the statute, but also
in consideration of the facts of the particular case.
A related concern is that a finding of moral turpitude per se freezes the law in
place at a particular time. Apart from en banc reversal, which is rare, a finding of
moral turpitude per se binds all future litigants. If the whole point of disciplinary
proceedings is to protect the public, should not the standard for attorney disbarment be able to adjust freely with public opinion?
Finally, a determination of what is "moral turpitude" is a policymaking, legislative function. Should not the legislature (in the District of Columbia, it is Congress) decide these questions, rather than an unelected judiciary? Perhaps not.
Courts traditionally have been the governmental bodies to oversee the lawyers
that practice before them. The statute vests some, but not all, discretion with the
Court of Appeals. Disbarment is not automatic for every crime, only those that
involve moral turpitude. Section 11-2503(a) vests the Court of Appeals with the
41 See infra Part IV.C.
42 See In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1175 (D.C. 1979) (Harris, J., dissenting) ("I feel strongly and I believe my view is shared by the great majority of persons who are knowledgeable in the field of
professional discipline - that the basic decisional responsibility for the sanction to be imposed in a
disciplinary proceeding should rest upon the judges of a jurisdiction's highest court, rather than upon
the members of a court-created disciplinary body,")
See also Dhanda, supra note 8, at 727 ("By considering the nexus between a particular crime and
an attorney's fitness to practice, the courts are better equipped to impose discipline that is appropriate
for an attorney's misconduct." ).
43 See In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 186 (D.C. 1976) (Kern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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power courts traditionally possess: applying and interpreting the law. The fact
that a court's interpretation of the law in one case is binding on the next should
not be surprising. Stare decisis is at the heart of Anglo-American common law.
Further, a lawyer-criminal has already received a full, thorough, and meaningful hearing on the facts of his case: the trial of his criminal case. 4 The automatic
disbarment statute fits together perfectly with the command of Laughlin v.
United States,45 a D.C. Circuit case, holding that an attorney cannot collaterally
challenge a conviction in disciplinary proceedings. 46 The principle emanating
from the courts is that an attorney gets one chance to test the government's evidence: at trial. In the interests of economy, it is not prudent or necessary to hold
a second hearing on the facts of the case. An attorney's conviction by proof at
trial beyond a reasonable doubt or by plea ends any question of the attorney's
guilt.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE FRAMEWORK

The question, then, of an lawyer-criminal's future in the profession comes
down to whether the crime of which he was convicted is one of moral turpitude.
The statute, D.C. Code § 11-2503(a), is mandatory in its terms. The name of an

attorney who has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude "shall be struck
from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to
be a member."

47

A.

Cases Deciding "Moral Turpitude"

Before trying to synthesize the Court of Appeals' jurisprudence on the subject,
I pause here to detail the crimes the Court has held to be and not to be crimes of
moral turpitude. Nearly every single case to be decided by the Court of Appeals
on the subject has been found to have involved moral turpitude. Only a handful
of crimes have been found not to involve moral turpitude per se. Table 1 lists
nearly all of the published decisions applying section 11-2503(a).
Each decision is nearly identical. Each is usually short and conclusory. Most
are only a page or two long. Many rely and incorporate the Board's unpublished
order in substitution of the Court's own analysis. Even in significant decisions
that decide moral turpitude for eternity-those that find moral turpitude per se-

the Court has rarely employed an analysis of more than a few sentences. This is
not surprising considering the elusiveness of the phrase "moral turpitude."
In recent years, the opinions cite analogous cases more often. For example, in
In re Bateman, the Court of Appeals concluded that conspiracy to possess co44

But see Dhanda, supra note 8, at 731.

45
46
47

474 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See id. at 454.
D.C. CODE § 11-2503(a) (1981).
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caine with intent to distribute involves moral turpitude per se, because analogous
cases, such as In re Mendes,4 8 held that possession with intent to distribute was a
crime of moral turpitude per se.
TABLE

1:

DECISIONS OF THE

D.C.

COURT OF APPEALS APPLYING THE

MORAL TURPITUDE STANDARD

Offense
Any misdemeanor

Moral Turpitude
Per Se?
no
no

Case
In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626 (D.C.
1992) (en banc)
In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626 (D.C.
1992) (en banc)

Aiding and abetting a person to
knowingly possess a false
identification document with the
intent to use the document to
defraud the United States (a
misdemeanor)
Aiding and assisting a person to
submit fraudulent and false federal
tax returns
Bank fraud

no49

In re McConnell, 502 A.2d 454
(D.C. 1985)

yes

Bribery

yes

Child abuse

yes

Conspiracy to defraud the U.S.

yes

In re Rosenbleet, 592 A.2d 1036
(D.C. 1991)50
In re Glover-Towne, 626 A.2d 1387
(D.C. 1993)
In re Wortzel, 698 A.2d 429 (D.C.
1997)
In re Hirschfield, 622 A.2d 688
(D.C. 1993)s'

Conspiracy to knowingly defraud the
I.R.S.
Conspiracy to possess heroin

yes

Conspiracy to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute onboard a vessel
Conspiracy to receive and conceal
narcotics
Conspiracy to sell narcotics

yes

Distribution of child pornography

yes

Embezzlement

yes

yes

yes
yes

In re Meisnere, 471 A.2d 269 (D.C.
1984)
In re Gates, No. D-32-79 (D.C.
1979) (published in appendix to In
re Roberson, 429 A.2d 530 (D.C.
1981))
In re Bateman, 699 A.2d 403 (D.C.
1997)
In re Roberson, 429 A.2d 530 (D.C.
1981)
In re Roberson, 429 A.2d 530 (D.C.
1981)
In re Wolff, 490 A.2d 1118 (D.C.
1985), affd en banc, 511 A.2d 1047
(D.C. 1986)
In re Venable, 641 A.2d 853 (D.C.
1993)52

48 In re Mendes, 598 A.2d 168 (D.C. 1991).
49 However, the Court found moral turpitude on the facts.
50 See also In re Saul, 671 A.2d 461 (D.C. 1996) (per curiam); In re Campbell, 635 A.2d 933
(D.C. 1994).
51 See also In re Lipari, 704 A.2d 851 (D.C. 1997); In re Matzkin, 665 A.2d 1388 (D.C. 1995).
52 See also In re Hernandez, 683 A.2d 764 (D.C. 1996); In re Eberhart, 678 A.2d 1023 (D.C.
1996).
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53
In re Sugarman,
677 A.2d 1049
(D.C. 1996)

Embezzlement by a bankruptcy
trustee
Failure to pay taxes

yes

False pretenses

yes

Filing a false tax return

no

Forgery

yes

Fraud in the second degree (District
of Columbia)
Grand larceny

yes

Grand theft

yes

Harassment of a federal witness

yes

Illegal campaign contributions
(misdemeanor)
Interstate transportation in
furtherance of a fraud
Mail fraud

no

no

yes

56

57

yes
yes

Misapplying funds of a financial
institution
Misappropriation of funds while
serving as a fiduciary
Obstruction of justice
(administrative proceedings)
Obstruction of justice (judicial
proceedings)
Offering a false instrument for filing

yes

Perjury

yes

yes
yes
yes
yes

In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760 (D.C.
1990)
In re Anderson, 474 A.2d 145 (D.C.
1984)
In re Kerr, 611 A.2d 551 (D.C.
1992)
In re 4S hwartz, 619 A.2d 39 (D.C.
1993)
In re Rosenbleet, 592 A.2d 1036
(D.C. 1991)
593 A.2d 183 (D.C.
In re 5Boyd,
5
1991)
In re Caplan, 691 A.2d 1152 (D.C.
1997) (interpreting California
statute)
In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336 (D.C.
1988)
In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182 (D.C.
1976)
In re Vaccaro, 539 A.2d 1094 (D.C.
1988)
In re pond, 519 A.2d 165 (D.C.
1986)
In re Reggie, 666 A.2d 69 (D.C.
1995)
In re O'Malley, 683 A.2d 464 (D.C.
1996)
In re Laurins, 576 A.2d 1351 (D.C.
1990)
In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.
59
1979)
In re Mirrer, 632 A.2d 117 (D.C.
1993)
In re Meisnere, 471 A.2d 269 (D.C.
1984)

53 See also In re Greenspan, 683 A.2d 158 (D.C. 1996).
54 See also In re Sluys, 632 A.2d 734 (D.C. 1993).
55 See also In re Solerwitz, 601 A.2d 1083 (D.C. 1992) (interpreting New York statute); In re
Slater, 627 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1993); In re Sluys, 632 A.2d 734 (D.C. 1993); In re Eberhart, 678 A.2d 1023
(D.C. 1996); In re Caplan, 691 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1997).
56 A reading of Shillaire,however, could lead to the interpretation that the Court believed that
moral turpitude existed on the facts. The Court did not explicitly state that it was deciding that every
harassment of a federal witness would be moral turpitude. Nonetheless, after noting that obstruction
of justice was moral turpitude per se, the Court then went on to compare obstruction of justice and
harassment of a federal witness and concluded that they were nearly identical. It is therefore
probable that Shillaire was a statement that harassment of a federal witness is moral turpitude per se.
57 This was the implicit holding of Wild, as noted by Judge Ferren in his concurrence in Colson.
See Colson, 412 A.2d at 1181.
58 See also In re Krowen, 573 A.2d 786 (D.C. 1990); In re Fox, 627 A.2d 511 (D.C. 1993); In
re Zimmer, 637 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1994); In re Juron, 649 A.2d 836 (D.C. 1994); In re Ferber, 703 A.2d
142 (D.C. 1997); In re Bereano, 719 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1998)
59 See also In re Schwartz, 619 A.2d 39 (D.C. 1993).
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Possession for sale of a controlled
substances
Possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute
Possession of heroin

yes

Possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute
Rape

yes

Receiving a bribe

yes

Receiving a gratuity

yes
yes

yes

no 6 0
61

no
Refusal of Congressional witness to
testify or produce papers
(misdemeanor)
Sale of a controlled substance

yes

Sodomy

yes

Soliciting a bribe

yes

Taking indecent liberties with a child
by a person in a custodial or
supervisory relationship
Taking property without a right

yes

Tax evasion
Theft (felony)
Theft by deception
Theft by failure to make required
disposition of property received
Theft of government property in
excess of $1,000

In re Hawkins, 685 A.2d 753 (D.C.
1996)
In re Mendes, 598 A.2d 168 (D.C.
1991)
In re Gates, No. D-32-79 (D.C.
1979) (published in appendix to In
re Roberson, 429 A.2d 530 (D.C.
1981))
In re Campbell, 572 A.2d 1059
(D.C. 1990)
In re Phillips, 452 A.2d 345 (D.C.
1982)
In re Olover-Towne, 626 A.2d 1387
(D.C. 1993)
In re Campbell, 522 A.2d 892 (D.C.
1987)
District of Columbia v. Kleindienst,
345 A.2d 146 (D.C. 1975)
In re Valentin, 710 A.2d 879 (D.C.
1998) (interpreting New York
statute)
In re Phillips, 452 A.2d 345 (D.C.
1982)
In re Glover-Towne, 626 A.2d 1387
(D.C. 1993)
In re Sharp, 674 A.2d 899 (D.C.
1996)

no62
no
yes
yes
yes
yes

In re Kent, 467 A.2d 982 (D.C.
1983)
In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760 (D.C.
1990)
In re Wiley, 666 A.2d 68 (D.C.
1995)63
In re Youmans, 617 A.2d 534 (D.C.
1993)
In re Hopmaver,
625 A.2d 290
6
(D.C. 1993) x
In re Milton, 642 A.2d 839 (D.C.
1994)

60 The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between gratuities accepted by a judge and
gratuities accepted by members of the executive and legislative branches. The Court specifically left
open the question of moral turpitude for executive and legislative employees. The Court found moral
turpitude on the facts because the lawyer-criminal was a judge.
61 This was the implicit holding of Kleindienst, as noted by Judge Ferren in his concurrence in
Colson. See Colson, 412 A.2d at 1181 n. 4.
62 Implied by the Court of Appeals' analysis under the former Disciplinary Rules, not D.C.
Code § 11-2503(a). The Court held, by implication, that Kent's offense did not involve moral
turpitude.
63 See also In re Taylor, 765 A.2d 546 (D.C. 2001); In re Cohen, 742 A.2d 896 (D.C. 1999).
64 d.
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Unlawful solicitation of money from
a Criminal Justice Act [indigent
criminal appointment statute] client

Use of an interstate telephone
communication with the intent, inter
alia, to promote racketeering and
bribery
Vehicular negligent homicide
Wire fraud

The Willcher Court
found moral
turpitude per se, but
In re McBride, 602
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1992)
(en banc), held that
no misdemeanor can
be a crime of moral
turpitude per se.
yes

no
yes

In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C.
1982)

In re Bankston, 749 A.2d 739 (D.C.
2000)

In re Small, 760 A.2d 612 (D.C.
2000)
In re Bond, 519 A.2d 165 (D.C.
1986)65

Thus, of the several dozen cases on the subject, only approximately ten found
that a particular crime did not involve moral turpitude. All misdemeanors, aiding

and abetting a person to knowingly possess a false identification document with
the intent to use the document to defraud the United States, aiding and assisting

a person to submit fraudulent and false federal tax returns, failure to pay taxes,
filing a false tax return, illegal campaign contributions, receiving a gratuity, refusal of a Congressional witness to testify or produce papers, taking property
without a right, vehicular negligent homicide, and tax evasion, were the only
crimes found not to involve moral turpitude.
C.

Synthesizing the Court of Appeals' Jurisprudence

In one of the first moral turpitude cases, In re Colson,6 6 the Court of Appeals
67

recognized that "[tihe term 'moral turpitude has less than a finite definition."

The Court gave guidance for future cases, however, and identified three different
definitions for "moral turpitude" that it said it would rely on. A crime of moral

turpitude is:
1.

"[one where] the act denounced by68the statute offends the generally
accepted moral code of mankind.

2.

"[a]n act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,

65 See also In re Chuang, 575 A.2d 725 (D.C. 1990); In re Cooper, 622 A.2d 1105 (D.C. 1993); In
re Lobar, 632 A.2d 110 (D.C. 1993); In re Ferber, 703 A.2d 142 (D.C. 1997).
66 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1979).
67 Id. at 1167. See also Linda Capel-Galiber, Project, DisciplinaryAction Against Attorneys for
Crimes of Moral Turpitude, 31 How. L.J. 313, 313 (1988) ("Each jurisdiction has its own definition for
moral turpitude. All are broadly defined in order to cover all attorney misconduct.").
68 Colson, 412 A.2d at 1168.
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3.

and customary rule of right and duty becontrary to the accepted
69
tween man and man.",
70
"[c]onduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."

The Court of Appeals, however, has rarely relied on or applied the above-cited
three-part test for moral turpitude, probably because the definitions are as unworkable as the term being defined.71
Based on an independent, post hoc analysis of the moral
turpitude cases, the
72
emerge:
turpitude
moral
of
crimes
of
categories
following
1. Misdemeanors
In 1992, the Court of Appeals restructured its moral turpitude analysis. In In
re McBride,73 the Court of Appeals held that misdemeanors could never be
crimes of moral turpitude per se.74 "[N]o conviction of a misdemeanor may be
deemed a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude per se, even though
that misdemeanor may be ... held to involve moral turpitude on the facts of the

case." 75 In other words, an attorney convicted of a misdemeanor is always entitled to a hearing to determine whether moral turpitude exists on the facts of the
particular case.7 6 If so, disbarment is still automatically required.

The en banc Court in McBride made a distinction between felonies and misdemeanors for three reasons. First, the term "moral turpitude" by its plain terms
involves a "revulsion of society."'77 However, misdemeanors by definition are
offenses that society, through elected legislators, has determined to be less serious. 78 Misdemeanors do not carry the same "revulsion" as felonies. Second, except for In re Willcher,7 9 no other case had found moral turpitude per se for a
misdemeanor.8 ° Thus, there had been in place already a de facto felony-misdemeanor bright-line rule. Finally, the Court noted that "intent to defraud," which
is a key phrase that the Court had relied on in the past in finding moral turpitude,
Id. (quoting 2 Bouv. LAW DICTIONARY 2247 (Rawles' 3d. Rev.)).
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1160 (4th ed. 1951)).
71 But see Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that phrase "crime involving
moral turpitude" is not void for vagueness).
72 One commentator has noted, "Moral turpitude is best defined by example." Capel-Galiber,
supra note 67, at 313.
73 In re McBride, 602 A,2d 626 (D.C. 1992) (en banc).
74 See id. at 629.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 635.
77 Id. at 632.
69
70

78

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (6th ed. 1990).

79
80

In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C. 1982).
See McBride, 602 A.2d at 633.
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had a specific meaning under the criminal law that was not directly translatable to
"moral turpitude." 81
2.

Theft and Fraud Offenses

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals has sometimes latched onto
language in certain criminal statutes that require "intent to defraud" as an element of a crime. In In re Meisnere,8 2 for example, an attorney was convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the Board's finding that conspiracy to defraud the IRS was a
crime of moral turpitude per se because conviction always required proof that the
defendant intended to defraud. "Criminal offenses involving theft and fraud inherently involve moral turpitude." 83 In this sense, the Court has almost adopted
a per se rule within a per se rule: Crimes involving an intent to defraud are almost
per se crimes of moral turpitude per se.
In contrast, however, in In re Shorter,84 the Court of Appeals rejected arguments for a finding of moral turpitude per se for tax evasion. Shorter concluded
that tax evasion is not as "evil" as other offenses 85 "While this 'evil' . . . impairs
governmental objects, its motivation is mere selfishness without any further abhorrent intention, such as would characterize a calculated attempt to harm others
the
for the sake of the harm."'86 The Court also noted that from time-to-time
87
number of people who have sought to evade paying taxes is "legion.",
In other cases, however, the Court of Appeals has found moral turpitude per
se when the offender unlawfully profits, for selfish gain, at the expense of others.
For example, in In re Hopmayer,88 an attorney was convicted of theft by failure to
make required disposition of property received. The Court found moral turpitude per se because the statute requires intentional dishonesty for personal gain.
This stands in stark contrast to the tax evasion line of cases, where it was held
that mere selfishness was not enough to justify automatic disbarment for moral
turpitude. Perhaps a distinction can be made between the cases in deception
towards the government (in the tax evasion cases) versus deception to clients and
innocent citizens. This characterization would also help to explain why other acts
involving defrauding innocents, such as embezzlement, mail fraud, and wire
fraud, have always been found to be moral turpitude per se.
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

See id.
In re Meisnere, 471 A.2d 269 (D.C. 1984).
In re Caplan, 691 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1997).
In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760 (D.C. 1990).
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
In re Hopmayer, 602 A.2d 655 (D.C. 1992), affd, 625 A.2d 290 (D.C. 1993).
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3. Narcotics Offenses
Involvement in the drug trade, whether as a possessor, 89 distributor, 90 or coconspirator,9 1 has always been held to be moral turpitude per se despite the fact
that there is often no nexus between the conduct and the attorney's profession.
The Court's opinions in this area have been summarily written and conclusory in
their analysis.
4. Sex-Related Crimes
Crimes of a sexual nature, such as rape, sodomy, and distribution of child pornography, have been routinely and unequivocally denounced by the Court as involving moral turpitude. In In re Wolff, 92 an attorney was found guilty in Virginia
of distribution of child pornography. The Court wrote, "The participant's desire
for ...

gratification [exceeded] his ability to demonstrate a public respect and

appreciation of existing societal morals and values." 9 3 This language invoked the
"good morals" definition of Colson, one of the few opinions to do so. Wolff was
also one of the few decisions where the Court of Appeals rejected the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility, perhaps indicating the seriousness with 94which the Court takes offenses such as distribution of child
pornography.
In In re Phillips,95 a case in which an attorney committed rape and sodomy,
one of the few cases involving violent crimes, the Court of Appeals, without hesitation and much discussion, found moral turpitude per se. The Court even went
so far as to refuse the attorney's request to resign voluntarily from the bar. 96 This
was the holding despite the clear absence of a nexus between the crimes of rape
and sodomy and the legal profession.
II. THE DIFFICULT CASES: TESTING THE FRAMEWORK

The fraud cases have been perhaps the easiest for the Court of Appeals to
decide. Not only are many of them felonies, but the statutes usually require a
specific intent to defraud. This intent to defraud goes to the integrity (or lack
89 See, e.g., In re Campbell, 572 A.2d 1059 (D.C. 1990).
90 See, e.g., In re Valentin, 710 A.2d 879 (D.C. 1998).
91 See, e.g., In re Roberson, 429 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1981).
92 490 A.2d 1118 (D.C. 1985).
93 Id. at 1120 (quoting Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So.2d 378, 380 (1970)).
94 Further, in In re Sharp, 674 A.2d 899 (D.C. 1996) the Court of Appeals concluded that the
Virginia offense of "taking liberties with a child" involved moral turpitude per se. But see In re
Wortzel, 698 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1997). In Wortzel, the Court summarily adopted the recommendation of
the Board to find moral turpitude per se in child abuse cases. While still finding moral turpitude, the
opinion lacked any of the scathing language used in Wolff.
95 In re Phillips, 452 A.2d 345 (D.C. 1982).
96 Id. at 348.
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thereof) of an attorney's relationship with others. If an attorney steals from his
employer, what is to say that he will not steal from his clients?
While many "greed" cases have been fairly easy and straightforward to decide,
other types of crimes-particularly more "minor" offenses-have given the
Court of Appeals considerable difficulty. In this section, I consider three types of
cases that have put the Court of Appeals to the test: administration of justice,
petty theft, and crimes caused in part by substance abuse.
A.

"Administration of Justice:" In Re Campbell & In Re Shillaire

Surprisingly, the Court has had trouble dealing with attorneys who commit
justice-related offenses. That is, the Court does not seem to hesitate disbarring
attorneys who commit crimes that are unrelated to the practice of law, such as
possession of narcotics or distribution of child pornography, but when it comes to
crimes that relate to the administration of justice, the Court has backed away
from finding moral turpitude in every offense.
In United States v. Campbell,97 a former D.C. Superior Court judge, Judge
Campbell, was convicted of receiving an illegal gratuity as a public official, a
crime under 18 U.S.C. § 201(g). Judge Campbell, who had a civil docket, accepted moving services from a trucking company that appeared numerous times
before him as a defendant. 98 Upon receipt of Judge Campbell's conviction in
federal district court, the D.C. Court of Appeals referred the matter to the Board
on Professional Responsibility for disciplinary proceedings. The Board made an
initial determination that receiving an illegal gratuity as a public official is not
moral turpitude per se. The Board referred the case to a hearing committee for
resolution of whether, on the facts, Judge Campbell's offense involved moral turpitude. The hearing committee concluded that it did not. However, a majority of
the Board disagreed and recommended automatic disbarment because the crime
on the facts involved moral turpitude.
The Court of Appeals agreed and automatically disbarred Judge Campbell for
commission of a crime that, on the facts, involved moral turpitude. 99 The Court,
however, declined to hold that acceptance of an illegal gratuity was per se moral
turpitude. 1° ° The Court and the Board both seemed to be concerned that there
might be cases where an elected or appointed governmental official might accept
a gratuity without being entirely blameworthy. The Board report states, "It
seems to us that citizens are prepared to accept a certain amount of human fallibility on the part of their judges."' 10 1 Are we?
97 U.S. v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
98 See In re Campbell, 522 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1987).
99 See id. at 895.
100 See id. at 894 ("We express no opinion as to cases involving government officials in the
executive and legislative branches. We deal here with a member of the judiciary.").
101 See id. at 895.
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Despite this finding, the Court and the Board both specifically condemned the
fact that there was a nexus between the offense and the administration of justice.
The Board report states, "[F]or judges to accept money from litigants in their
courts, even though they in fact do nothing to favor those litigants, strikes at the
core of the impartiality demanded for judges."10 2 If so, should not a finding of
moral turpitude per se automatically follow? If the principal purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect society and the courts, 10 3 should not acceptance of
a gratuity have been high on the Court of Appeals' list of crimes of moral turpitude per se? Should not the Court's previous decisions relating to obstruction of
justice, such as In re Colson, one of the first moral turpitude cases, have
controlled?
One year after Campbell, the Court of Appeals decided In re Shillaire,'0 4 a
case that should seemingly be controlled by Campbell, but was not. In Shillaire,
an attorney had harassed a federal witness, a crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b). The Court of Appeals concluded that harassment of a federal witness
is moral turpitude per se.105 The Court was particularly focused on the interests
of community and the protection of the judicial process. The opinion noted,
"[Tjhe community has rights too.' 1 6 Yet, the opinion did not analogize or distinguish Campbell, which had been decided only a few months before. Why are
the community's "rights" any less important when a judge accepts an illegal gratuity as when an attorney harasses a witness?
An argument can be made that Campbell is more serious than Shillaire. A
corrupt attorney's attempts to undermine the judicial system can do great damage to the system, for sure. But a corrupt judge, who has the power to make
dozens of critical decisions a day, can do much more damage than a corrupt
attorney.
This is not to say that the result in Judge Campbell's case would have been any
different had the Court decided that his acceptance of a gratuity involved moral
turpitude per se. Both the Board and the Court found moral turpitude in Judge
Campbell's case on the facts. He was, thus, automatically disbarred. The only
"problem" or "dilemma" is that, now, any future case of acceptance of a gratuity
by a public official will not result in automatic disbarment. Instead, the case will
be analyzed for moral turpitude on the facts. The question must be asked: Why
should a judge or other high ranking government official who undermines governmental integrity possibly receive a lesser disciplinary sanction than an attorney who commits a crime unrelated to the functioning of the government?
102
103
part).
104
105
106

Id. at 897.
In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 186 (D.C. 1976) (Kern, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336 (D.C. 1988).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 338.
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B.

"Petty Theft.'" In Re Kent & In Re Spiridion

As discussed previously, the Court of Appeals has had little difficulty finding
moral turpitude when an attorney steals or deceives people out of thousands of
dollars.1 °7 But what about minor thefts? Two cases, In re Kent a0 8 and In re
Spiridon,10 9 illustrate the difficulty the Court of Appeals and the Board on Professional Responsibility have had, over time, in dealing with petty thefts.
In re Kent involved the discipline of a former Department of Justice trial attorney, Lorna Kent, who, "while suffering from transient emotional distress," entered a department store in Washington, D.C., and shoplifted.110 The manner in
which Ms. Kent-a distinguished DOJ employee-shoplifted, however, indicated
to the Court that her behavior was out-of-character for her.11 Although suffering from emotional problems for several years, one day she "snapped," left work,
entered a nearby department store and began randomly grabbing merchandise
and stuffing it into her bag. "She did this in an open fashion, aware that sales
' 112
She later pled guilty
clerks and store detectives were observing her actions.
1 13
to taking property without right, a misdemeanor.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Ms. Kent's unusual and out-of-character
actions were not moral turpitude under Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3). 1 4 "IT]he
unusual facts and circumstances of this case clearly indicate that respondent's
actions were prompted by a neurotic desire to be caught rather than a desire for
personal profit. '115 The Court found that Ms. Kent's actions involved "dishonesty," in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), and ordered her suspended
for 30 days.1 16 The Court was particularly focused on the fact that Ms. Kent's
incident of dishonesty was
actions were not for personal gain and her "single
117
completely unrelated to her practice of law."
However, in other cases, the Court has clearly rejected any practice-of-lawnexus test.118 Why does this factor suddenly become relevant in Kent? Perhaps
one explanation is that the Court was actually placing the most weight on the
107 See Theft and Fraud Offenses, infra Part II.C.2.
108 In re Kent, 467 A.2d 982 (D.C. 1983).
109 In re Spiridion,755 A.2d 463 (D.C. 2000).
110 Kent, 467 A.2d at 983.
111 See id. at 984.
112 Id. at 983.
113 In re Kent was not a moral turpitude case. She was prosecuted under the then-Disciplinary
Rules, not D.C. Code § 11-2503(a). This is in line with the court's future holding in In re McBride that
misdemeanors could never involve moral turpitude per se.
114 See id. at 984. This was not a case being prosecuted under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a).
115 Id.
116 See id. at 985. The Board on Professional Responsibility had ordered a 1-year plus 1-day
suspension. See id.
117 Id.
118 See Sex-Related Crimes, infra Part II.C.4.
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other cited reason, the lack of personal profit motive. But is it possible to draw a
distinction between a theft-type crime committed for personal gain and a thefttype crime committed for another reason? Is there any other reason why a person would commit theft but not be motivated by personalgain? The Court almost
seems to suggest that Ms. Kent was, in fact, not guilty of theft because she lacked
criminal intent. 1 9 If that is the case, what of the Court's admonition in In re
Colson, that a disciplinary proceeding is not an opportunity to retry one's
case?

120

Or, perhaps the somewhat pathetic facts of Kent led the Court to inject some
equity or legal realism into its decision-making, a factor which might explain the
other case concerning "petty" theft, In re Spiridon.1 21 John Spiridon was licensed
to practice law in Maryland, but never obtained a job as an attorney. In 1996, he
was working as a bus driver for the city of Ocean City, Maryland. He was convicted of theft, a misdemeanor under Maryland law, for stealing $18 from his bus
fares. He claimed that alcoholism and family troubles had led him to commit the
act spontaneously. Because the crime Spiridon was convicted of was a misdemeanor, the Board had to examine the case to determine whether there was
moral turpitude on the facts. While rejecting Spiridon's argument that he should
not be disbarred for stealing a "de minimis" amount of money, $18, the Board
also rejected Bar Counsel's argument that "theft is theft" and all thefts should be
dealt with equally. After taking into account Spiridon's alcoholism, family difficulties, his inability to find a job in the legal field, the blatant nature of his actions
(he had stolen the money in plain view of the passengers), and the relatively
small amount of money involved, the Board found that moral turpitude was not
present on the facts, and recommended that the Court of Appeals suspend
Spiridon for one year, with a requirement that he demonstrate fitness before reinstatement. Bar Counsel took exception to the Board's decision and filed an
appeal. Bar Counsel's argument before the Court was that theft offenses which
involve an intent to defraud must result in disbarment on the facts, regardless of
whether they are misdemeanors or felonies.
The Court's decision explicitly rejected this argument. Calling Bar Counsel's
argument "inflexible," the Court held that "McBride and subsequent decisions
applying it make clear that, when a misdemeanor conviction is at issue, it is not
enough to look solely to the elements of the offense to determine moral turpitude, even if the offense would involve moral turpitude per se were it a felony.",122 The Court then conducted a fact-specific analysis of the case. Agreeing
with the Board that the amount of money involved ($18) was relatively small and
119 Kent, 467 A.2d
120
121
122

at 984.
See Colson, 412 A.2d at 1167.
755 A.2d 463 (D.C. 2000).
Id. at 466.
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that the evidence was not clear whether Spiridon took the money for personal
gain or because of "'self-defeating behavior' consistent with his psychological
12 3
problems.
Spiridon highlights the importance of McBride's misdemeanor-felony distinction. Since misdemeanors can never be crimes of moral turpitude per se, attor-

neys that commit them must necessarily be given a chance to argue the issue of
moral turpitude on the facts. Is this fair, though? Why should misdemeanants
receive a chance to avoid the moral turpitude rule while felons must be automatically disbarred? The Spiridon Court answered the question with a "homely example:", 124 the person who steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving children.
Such a crime may be moral turpitude per se "if society deems it an unexcused
felony offense, but if society has deemed it only a misdemeanor, then for McBride purposes the motive can be taken into account. '125 The Court thus correctly recognizes that the moral turpitude question is largely dependent on the
classifications in the criminal codes by the political branches of government.
C.

Substance Abuse: In Re Kersey

The D.C. Court of Appeals and Board on Professional Responsibility are continually inflicted with the problem of attorneys who commit crimes or violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct because of alcoholism or other substance abuse.
Indeed, the District of Columbia is not alone in this area; most disciplinary au126
thorities have struggled with this issue.
There is good reason to believe that the incidence of substance abuse, including alcoholism, amongst attorneys is on the rise. 127 A 1987 survey of the Washington state bar found that one-quarter of lawyers had tried cocaine sometime in
their lives. 128 Eighteen percent admitted to being alcoholics. 129 Substance abuse
is also not just confined to members of the bar; law students suffer as well. A
1993 study by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) found that 9%
of law students had used some illegal substance in the month prior to the
study. 130 Most had used marijuana, but others had used cocaine, heroin, and
13 1

LSD.

123
124
125
126
127
(1994).
128
129
130
131

Id. at 467.
Id. at 466.
Id.
See Wilson, supra note 4, at 265-69.
See Richard M. Marano, AppropriateDiscipline for the Attorney-Addict, 68 CONN. B.J. 368
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Law Students and Drugs, A.B.A. J.,Mar. 1993, at 25.
id.
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Alcoholism and substance abuse lead to a number of problems including
missed filing deadlines, failure to advise clients of the status of legal proceedings,
failure to appear in court as scheduled, unauthorized use of clients' funds to support the attorney-addict's habit, and a general inattention to work.132
Because of the seriousness of the problem, some have called for more attempts
by the bar to help fellow attorneys overcome their addictions. 1 33 "A policy of
helping attorneys overcome their substance abuse would be furthered by allowing
attempts by the
a mitigation of attorney discipline on a showing of good-faith
1 34
dependency.'
his
of
himself
rid
to
question
in
attorney
The D.C. Court of Appeals does not consider alcoholism-or any other mitigating factor-in moral turpitude proceedings. That is because the statute, D.C.
Code § 11-2503(a), is mandatory in its terms. The Court of Appeals held in In re
Hopmayer1 35 that the only issue in a case where an attorney commits a crime of
moral turpitude (whether per se or on the facts) is whether a valid criminal con1 36
viction was entered.
In cases where moral turpitude is not found, and an attorney is being charged
with merely violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, alcoholism can be considered as a mitigating factor.' 37 In re Kersey138 is the definitive case on the
subject. In Kersey, an attorney was charged with committing over twenty ethical
violations. However, the Court of Appeals found that Kersey's "professional
conduct was substantially affected by his alcoholism" and ordered five years of
probation, with a suspended order of disbarment.' 39 The Court admonished,
however, that, "We recognize that the path to recovery from alcoholism is not
always a straight and narrow one. Thus, any violation will not necessarily mandate revocation of Kersey's probation."' 140 Kersey frequently drank a fifth of
rum everyday. This led his law practice to go into disarray. He missed court
appearances, arrived late, appeared disheveled, was unprepared, commingled client funds, and was twice arrested for drunk-driving.' 4 ' The Court mitigated, but
did not excuse, these violations because of Kersey's alcoholism,1 42 "We agree
132 Marano, supra note 127, at 368.
133 Id. at 370 ("a crucial concern [is] helping attorneys who are substance abusers begin the
long, hard road to recovery.").
134 Id.
135 In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290 (D.C. 1993).
136 See id. at 291.
137 See In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 326 (D.C. 1987) ("Today we hold that alcoholism is a mitigating factor to be considered in determining discipline.").
138 Id. at 321.
139 Id. at 328.
140 Id. at 328 n. 23.
141 See id. at 324.
142 See id. at 322 ("While no jurisdiction has ever held that alcoholism is a defense to charges of
professional conduct, many jurisdictions have considered it a mitigating factor when imposing
discipline.").
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with the Committee and the Board that a sufficient nexus between Kersey's alcoholism and his misconduct has been established."' 4 3 Thus, Kersey established
that there exists a "but-for" test in order to mitigate discipline because of
alcoholism."'
The alcoholic-attorney has the burden of proving that his or her alcoholism
"'substantially affected' the charged misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. 14 5 Proof varies from case-to-case.' 4 6 However, as explained by the
Court in In re Temple,"47 alcoholism does not have to be the only cause of the
misconduct; there may be other factors which contribute to the ethical violations.14' "[T]he attorney must show that the factor was sufficiently determinative
49
Temof his conduct that its removal can be expected to end the misconduct.'
ple also held that addiction to prescription drugs could also be considered in miti1 50
gation so long as the medicine was lawfully obtained.
CONCLUSION

In the Court of Appeals' three decades of jurisprudence interpreting D.C.
Code § 11-2503(a)'s "moral turpitude" language, the Court has tried to answer
the following fundamental question that every disciplinary authority must ask:
For which crimes should attorneys be automatically disbarred? The answer is as
complicated as the question.
Cases such as Kent and Spiridon demonstrate that the Court of Appeals often
tries to inject equitable, case-by-case considerations into its decisions. D.C. Code
§ 11-2503(a), however, directs the Court's analysis, much to the Court's chagrin.
One Board member wrote, "We, as lawyers, face with dread the determination of
what crimes involve 'moral turpitude."151 Despite outlining three possible definitions of "moral turpitude" in Colson, the Court of Appeals and the Board on
Professional Responsibility continue to wallow in statute-by-statute determinations of moral turpitude per se. While the list of statutes that have been evaluated for moral turpitude has grown to several dozen, there are many that have
not. What of involuntary manslaughter? 1 52 Public intoxication?
143 Id. at 327.
144 See id. at 327 ("We hold that this 'but for' test is the standard that must be met in order to
prove causation in disciplinary cases involving alcoholism.").
145 In re Miller, 553 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C. 1989).
146 See id. at 204.
147 In re Temple, 596 A.2d 585 (D.C. 1991).
148 See id. at 590.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 586.
151 In re Campbell, 522 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1987).
152 The Court in In re Hoare, 727 A.2d 316, 317 (D.C. 1999), sidestepped the issue of whether
aggravated reckless homicide was a crime of moral turpitude per se. See id. ("we express no opinion
on the Board's finding that respondent's conduct did not involve moral turpitude.). However, the
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Is a statutory change likely? It appears not. D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) has not
been amended at all since the early 1970s. Congress appears content to allow the
Court of Appeals and its Board decide these cases as they appear.
Notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, the Court of Appeals has decided a relatively consistent jurisprudence on lawyer crime. The consistency is
that nearly all crimes involve moral turpitude. In the few decisions that have
interpreted those few statutes as not involving moral turpitude (at least not per
se), it is not clear, however, whether the Court has been altogether consistent
with its precedent. This interpretation is not surprising given the posture in
which section 11-2503(a) cases end up in the Court's lap.
Perhaps a time will come, however, when Judge Harris and Judge Nebeker's
dissent in Colson will be resurrected. They wrote: "The majority opinion makes
disbarment appear both routine and inevitable., 15 3 Given the recent literature
on substance abuse by attorneys, there might soon be a call for a return to caseby-case, rather than statute-by-statute, determinations. Section 11-2503(a)
presents cases in an awkward way to the Court: Stare decisis is mandated by statute. The result is a quasi-penal code that makes virtually all illegal acts cause for
automatic disbarment.
Despite this seeming imbalance in the "system," it is not clear that public or
judicial opinion can change the ebb and flow of the tide. Calls for increased, or a
return to, professionalism are only likely to lead to more in the way of automatic
disbarments, in order to protect the public from the handful of criminals who fill
our profession's ranks.

Court in In re Small, 760 A.2d 612 (D.C. 2000), recently held that vehicular negligent homicide was
not a crime of moral turpitude per se.
153 In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1169 (D.C. 1979).

